arXiv:2606.13621v2 Announce Type: replace-cross

Abstract: Formal safety analysis determines whether a system admits a safe defense; adaptive evaluation characterizes the operating quality sustained under adversarial interaction. Both answers matter because systems with the same safety verdict can impose very different operational burdens.

We introduce shielded analysis, a design-time framework that derives these answers from one encoded system while keeping the safety requirement and admissible threat model independently variable. It returns a defensibility certificate and a four-axis defensibility fingerprint spanning structural margin, shield latitude, and adaptive operating quality. Each axis is informative in its own right; their relationships show whether formal and operational assessments agree, diverge, or respond differently to system changes.

We instantiate the framework for network defense on a reference segment and four controlled perturbations spanning topology, safety requirements, and adversary capabilities. Every configuration is certified defensible, yet two topology variants with nearly identical structural profiles sustain mean clean-host fractions of 22.7% and 80.7% under adaptive pressure.

Shielded analysis turns a safety-game solution into a comparative instrument: it determines whether a defense exists, characterizes what that defense requires, and identifies which system changes strengthen it.