Generalized belief states in transformers
Many thanks to Xavier Poncini, Paul Riechers, Fernando Rosas, and Matt Smith for useful conversations.
1. Introduction
Despite the recent successes of transformers and other sequence models, there are still many open questions about their basic principles of operation. For example, what internal representations do these models use for prediction and generation? Can we decode, interpret, and manipulate such representations? Is it even possible to consider a notion of representation without reference to an external world model?
To make progress on these questions, I propose a general way to define, decode and manipulate representations in sequence models. The approach is centered on the concept of "generalized belief states", statistics of past observations that satisfy a few criteria: (1) they are sufficient for predicting future data, (2) they can be recursively updated as new observations come in, and (3) they are low-dimensional, allowing for visualization and interpretation. I show that such generalized belief states can be mapped to the internal activations and dynamics of a sequence model, allowing for decoding and manipulation of the model's representations. I illustrate the ideas using a tractable toy model, a transformer trained on a simple HMM stochastic process, where we will see that the KV cache plays a key role.
This post is directly inspired by the 2024 paper "Transformers Represent Belief State Geometry in their Residual Stream" by Adam Shai, Paul Riechers, and collaborators. That paper introduced the idea of studying belief states in transformers, and proposed a method for doing so using tractable toy models. I recommend reading that paper if you haven't already, though it is not a prerequisite for understanding my post. Section 5 compares this approach with the one developed in that paper.
2. Belief states
We start at a general level, by considering the problem of sequence prediction. Imagine that we observe a history of previous tokens and then wish to predict the next token . We assume that sequences are drawn from a stochastic process . For now, it does not matter whether this process comes from real-world data or a generative model.
Before proceeding, we introduce a bit of notation. indicates the token alphabet, indicates the set of finite-length sequences (including the empty history ), and indicates the set of probability distributions over the alphabet . We write for the set of histories with positive probability under the stochastic process.
2.1 Hidden Markov models
To optimally predict the next token after observing history , we must compute the conditional distribution . We may now ask: what information should we track in order to compute this distribution? How should this information be updated as new tokens arrive? Does this information represent some unobserved latent aspect of the stochastic process?
These questions have a straightforward answer when the stochastic process is described as the output of a hidden Markov model (HMM). Given an HMM description, we can write the probability of any history as [1] where is the hidden state of the HMM at step , is the probability of emitting token and transitioning to hidden state from hidden state , and is the initial distribution over hidden states. Using this expression and Bayes' rule, the next-token distribution can be written in a factorized form as Here, is the Bayesian posterior distribution over the hidden state, conditioned on the observed history . This posterior distribution corresponds to the beliefs of a Bayesian observer about the underlying states of the generating process, and in the literature, it is called a belief state. [2]
Belief states satisfy two important properties: sufficiency and recurrence. Sufficiency means that the belief state allows us to predict the next token just as well as if we knew the whole history , as seen from the prediction map in Eq. (1a). Recurrence means that, after observing a new token , the updated belief state can be computed from and alone. In particular, using Bayes' rule, we can write the update map as
In addition to sufficiency and recurrence, belief states have several other attractive properties. For instance, the prediction map (1a) is time-independent and linear in . Time-independence lets us interpret belief states at different steps in the same way; linearity lets us interpret predictions as convex mixtures of those made by individual hidden states. The update map (1b) is also time-independent and "nearly" linear, being a ratio of two linear functions of the belief state. (In fact, without loss of generality, we may instead consider "unnormalized" belief states , which update in a purely linear way . [3] )
In practice, belief states are often encoded as nonnegative vectors: where is the number of hidden states of the HMM. In this way, each belief state is a nonnegative -dimensional vector that sums to 1, so it belongs to a -dimensional affine subspace of . For HMMs with few hidden states, belief states belong to a low-dimensional space, allowing for easy visualization and interpretation. Also, in this space, belief states often exhibit a remarkable fractal structure, which arises from the recursive nature of the update map. [4]
2.2 Example
To make things concrete, we now introduce a running example: a stochastic process called MRRXOR that is generated by an HMM with five hidden states. [5] The HMM emits two independent random bits, then their XOR, and then resets. In addition, at each time point, the hidden state can jump to another random hidden state with probability ; if this random jump occurs, it does not emit a token and is immediately followed by an ordinary transition. The HMM is shown in the following figure, with each transition labeled by its emitted bit and probability. (For visual clarity, the random jumps between hidden states are not shown.)
Next, we illustrate the geometry of belief states for this HMM. We compute the belief states after each of the possible histories of length . Each belief state is a normalized nonnegative vector that belongs to a four-dimensional affine hyperplane of .
We visualize these vectors using principal component analysis (PCA), showing all six pairs of the four non-trivial principal components. Each belief state is colored by the last two tokens of the history, with its point area proportional to the history probability. Black dots correspond to each of the five hidden states A–E.
PC1 largely tracks the probability of the "reset" state A, i.e., the belief that an XOR triple has just been completed. PC2 separates histories by their last token. PC3 s
Enterprise AI is waiting for its PageRank moment
Let’s try a little thought experiment in technology-fiction: what would have happened if Larry Page and Sergey Brin’s PageRank, back in 1998, had failed to attract its first investors? Google didn’t invent the search engine: there were plenty of them before, from AltaVista, Excite, Lycos or others who were counting words on pages and selling their results page to the highest bidder, to catalog or portal concepts such as Yahoo! or AOL, that attempted to capture the users’ attention as much as they could to be able to serve them advertising, the more the better. Imagine if these concepts would have gone the distance, and deprived us of the web that resulted from Google’s easy and efficient way of searching …
What did Larry Page and Sergey Brin realize? They adapted and extended the citation index (or its consequence, the citation impact), a system that they knew worked for academic literature (remember, these guys were graduate students working on their Ph.D., and thus reading academic papers like there was no tomorrow!), and moved it into a new context: the web. They realized there was an underused signal, relationships among pages, and used it to generate a metric, weighting links according to the importance of the pages providing them, that not only allowed them to index the web, but also to define attention as a social construct: a page is important when other pages link to it with a certain term.
What’s today’s underused signal in corporate AI?
As I’ve said several times, corporate AI is completely different from individual AI: companies don’t need just answers to questions, what they need is persistent memory and state, feedback learning loops, embedded cybersecurity, logs that can be tracked and not manipulated, etc.
So far, companies are building these required scaffolding using twentieth-century tools such as Python, and AI agents are proving to be smart enough as to escape from these containments and do all sort of bad things — not because they are intrinsically evil (they cannot be), but because the goals and the guardrails are badly defined, or due to excessive permissions, prompt injection, or weak isolation. These companies are trying to define these properties by repeatedly assembling application by application, rather than supplied coherently by the platform.
However, companies are repeatedly making all sorts of decisions about suppliers, customers, inventory, pricing, service, etc. Those decisions are constantly generating evidence of what works and what not, provided that the company is smart enough to capture them. What if we could evaluate AI by whether the company learns and improves, beyond the quality of individual outputs? What if AI optimization becomes more important than having access to bigger models?
The competition moves from model capabilities to system performance
A company does not just need a very powerful AI model: it needs an architecture that coordinates capabilities toward its goals. Researchers writing on Berkeley’s AI research blog explicitly describe the shift toward compound AI systems, where system design can offer better returns than further model scaling.
Other experiments, such as FrugalGPT or DSPy are specific precedents for making model selection subordinate to results: FrugalGPT demonstrated that model cascades can match the strongest individual model with up to 98% lower cost on its evaluated tasks, and DSPy showed that optimized pipelines using smaller models can compete with approaches using much larger proprietary models.
What makes the next step consequential? The ability to learn across executions. If we manage to make each interaction inform subsequent decisions across the relevant population, we can achieve a substantial advantage. And world models
世界模型首次指导设计芯片!超大核NPU700TOPS,99%算力可用
L4需要更大的模型,芯片得换个造法了
(本文作者为 互联网江湖,钛媒体经授权发布)
文 | 互联网江湖,作者 | Evin,编辑 | 刘致呈
如果你长期跟踪智驾行业,会察觉到一个变化正在悄然发生:发布会上的主角,正在从“技术”换成“量产”。
2026年以来,L4落地声量明显抬升,城市NOA渗透率持续走高,车企量产军备竞赛全面打响。
从“技术竞争”换轨到“量产竞争”,已是行业明牌。
但换轨途中横着一个尴尬的现实:多数通用芯片正在拖量产的后腿。
车规环境下,通用芯片的“不可能三角”凸显:账面算力与有效算力相差悬殊,利用率往往只有30%—40%。
这笔被浪费的差价,堪称L4规模化路上一笔“隐性税”。
10月29日,转机出现了。
XHEART新芯航途CEO李宗霖正式发布大模型芯片X7 Ultra:700 TOPS大模型算力、超大核NPU、高精度专用算子加速、Armv9车规级CPU。

这颗芯片自创立之初就沿着一条另类的路线前行——“大模型定义芯片”:不追求通用性的面面俱到,而是由大模型反向定义硬件。
这有点像当年的DeepSeek。
DeepSeek的出现为AI行业指明了,大模型不必沿着旧算力逻辑硬堆也能跑出新的可能性,此后AI应用如雨后春笋般生长。
如今,X7 Ultra则为L4验证了,L4的落地也不必拘泥于通用芯片的算力瓶颈,L4量产落地,有了一条新路。
自此,L4量产的DeepSeek时刻来了。
大模型芯片发布,L4落地有了“新基建”
大模型定义芯片不是实验室里的炫技,而是量产需求倒逼出来的必然产物。
推动力首先来自市场端。
最近一段时间,车企新车的大模型和辅助驾驶能力正在全面标配。
工信部数据显示,2026年以来乘用车组合驾驶辅助渗透率已达70.5%,NOA渗透率超过30%,首批L3车型也开始在特定区域上路。
随着端到端的智驾普及,接下来,车企的每一款新车立项,都会用上更强的芯片。

与此同时,AI模型体量越来越大,对芯片性能的要求也越来越高。
Momenta CEO曹旭东判断,未来规模化L4需要10B—100B量级的大模型来应对复杂长尾场景。
新一代大模型规模化上车,带来的直接问题是:通用芯片接不住。
为什么接不住?
因为量产赛场上最难的,是三条互相拉扯的硬指标。
首先,要“跑得起来”,就得满足算力和功耗的硬性要求——10B—100B的模型要在几十瓦功耗、毫秒级延迟下运行,通用芯片为灵活性预留的架构冗余,在车端反而成了负担,大量算力耗在架构开销而非有效计算上。
其次,要实现“规模上车”,那么对应成本——成本必须降到付费方持续买单的水平,并为折旧运维留出利润空间。而在通用芯片的定价体系下,车企很难算平成本账。
最后一点,也是最重要的一点:安全。L4阶段责任主体转移到主机厂,安全成为“生死线”,芯片的计算行为必须可预测、可验证——同样的输入产生稳定输出,负载变化时延迟可控,结果可被完整追溯。而时快时慢、利用率飘移的通用平台,撑不起安全底线的工程化验证。
最终,结论只有一个:市场需要一颗从大模型需求出发设计的大模型芯片。
L4的落地发展,其实有点像前几年AI行业。
ChatGPT火了之后,模型对算力的需求越来越大,直到DeepSeek给AI行业开辟了一条新路。
从底层逻辑上来看,大模型定义芯片,恰如当年DeepSeek的发布。
DeepSeek证明了AI大模型不必硬堆参数、硬烧算力卡,通过架构创新提升AI infra层的效率,也能跑出规模应用。如今,在L4这个赛道,X7 Ultra发布之后,XHEART通过NPU架构创新,再次验证了这条路径。
从这个意义上讲,XHEART和Momenta要做的事情,相当于L4落地的“新基建”。

L4怎么量产落地?
关键核心在于解决几个问题:
第一,从NPU入手,解决效能问题。
传统智驾芯片的NPU由多个小核拼凑,核间数据交互在百GB/s量级,大量算力耗在“内部搬运”上。
大模型定义芯片则从根本上解决了这个问题。X7 Ultra把计算单元聚合成一个超大核,内部互联速率拉到TB/s级。
但仅此还不够,数据能在核内高效流动,计算本身也得高效。
这就是第二点:靠专用算子,解决延迟问题。
Transformer架构里的高频计算,过去在NPU里跑不动、只能绕道CPU,一来一回既费带宽又费时间。
为此,XHEART从2023年起便与Momenta算法团队联合研究模型架构及关键算子,为这些高频算子配备了专用硬件,原生支持FP16/FP32高精度向量计算——关键计算既快,又不丢精度。
高精度带来计算行为的确定与可预测,这正是安全验证的物理基础。
还有,靠整网级工具链重构,解决最终上车的问题.
传统推理是算子逐个执行、中间结果反复写回外部内存;XHEART的做法是把整张网络统一编排、融合,实现“整网内存零拷贝”,结果就是内存带宽消耗降下来了,同一块芯片能跑更大的模型,单位算力的成本自然也就降下来了。
最终实测数据给出了答案:NPU计算利用率98.7%,内存带宽消耗比行业旗舰低80%,能效翻倍。
X7 Ultra的700 TOPS大模型算力,也是在真实量产智驾模型上测得的,前提是量化后模型输出与FP32模型的相似度达到99.99%以上。模型结构不能随意改,精度和驾驶体验不能打折——性能优化从一开始,就要对准量产要求。
实际上,大模型定义芯片,不是在某一个指标上做加法,而是让此前互相拉扯的算力、成本、安全,在同一个架构里被同时满足——它给L4的到来铺平了一条路。
对行业而言,这背后还意味着一场更深层的变化:智驾的竞争逻辑,正从“堆算力”转向“系统竞争”。
过去L2普及阶段,行业信奉“算力越高,智驾越强”的公式,但现在,L4落地要求系统竞争,背后是算力、成本、功耗、安全四者之间的协同。
简而言之,这场比赛的规则变了,从“单项锦标赛”进入了“团体赛”。
这个逻辑在新能源汽车行业已有先例:比亚迪的闪充技术本质上就是“系统竞争”:单靠堆电池容量解决不了补能焦虑——只有当电池、平台、桩、储能在架构层面协同设计,快充才能真正落地。
同理,单靠堆算力也解决不了智驾的天花板。
把镜头再拉远一点,大模型芯片并非孤例,而是专用化AI芯片浪潮中最先被推到台前的场景之一。
芯片专用化、软硬一体早已是大势所趋。
谷歌TPU从诞生之初就只为加速神经网络计算服务,专用芯片正变成AI算力结构中的重要一极。
汽车行业亦然,主机厂不再满足于采购通用座舱或智驾芯片,而是直接参与定义甚至自研专用芯片,L4量产阶段尤甚。
X7 Ultra正是这个逻辑的产物:它对大模型的“适配”不是软件层面的修修补补,而是架构层面的血脉相通——不做算法去适配芯片,而是芯片天然契合大模型计算。
这等于从芯片定义逻辑上,诞生了一个新物种。而这个新物种,不是L4的配套,而是L4量产的前置条件。
从此,L4量产的大门才真正被打开。
L4只是起点,真正的未来在物理AI
在汽车产业链条上,判断一条技术路线的成色,最终要回到一个朴素的问题:它装进车里了吗?
在这一点上,Momenta与XHEART已经交出了答卷。
X7系列的客户车型包括上汽大众ID. ERA 9X/8X、荣威家越07、MG07等,从德系合资巨头到自主品牌头部,这表明双方的软硬协同已跨过“PPT协同”阶段,进入可验证的商业化落地。
同时,也足以见得大模型定义芯片,未来商业化落地的路径清晰。
从智驾技术演进来看,量产本身就是最好的验证场。
只有在真实车型、真实用户、真实路况中打磨成熟的软硬协同能力,才能更好迭代,产品技术,进而带动L4进一步实现规模化。

曹旭东给出的时间表是:L3和L4有望在2028年迎来重要引爆点,2030年走向规模化落地。
加速这一进程的,正是大模型芯片。
当模型需求直接定义芯片,算法、软件、芯片的迭代节拍第一次被拉到同一节奏上,行业进化速度自然会变快。
据了解,基于X7 Ultra的支撑,Momenta发布的R7 Ultra世界模型,参数规模将扩大5—10倍,安全性能同步提升5—10倍以上,推动世界模型从“理解世界”走向“推演世界”。
至此,L4 商业化落地的最后一块拼图,已经摆上了桌面。
但如果只盯着眼前的装车量,仍然低估了大模型定义芯片的价值。
大模型定义芯片的想象力,可能远不止于L4。
它更深的护城河,在于这套研发方式可以迭代延续:一颗为模型而生的芯片,其研发过程沉淀的是可继承的资产——量产模型参与硅前验证的经验、模型与芯片团队联合调试的协作机制、精度与效率之间取舍的方法论……
这些无形资产不会随一代产品退役,而会完整传递到下一代芯片上,支撑未来更大的模型在性能、能效、系统成本和交付效率上持续优化。
这个剧本似曾相识。
当年,英伟达靠CUDA生态绑定AI开发,也是靠芯片架构技术代际更迭能力,统治了AI算力市场。如今,专注芯片、聚焦AI计算、以软硬件协同构建壁垒,大模型芯片的进化逻辑,某种意义上与之高度相似。
这个方向下,XHEART的定位从一开始就不止于智驾,其官方表述是“一家专注于大模型计算的芯片设计公司……并应用于智能汽车,现正向机器人等领域拓展”。
曹旭东也明确指出,大模型定义芯片的思路可以进一步推动机器人以及更多物理AI应用取得突破。
物理AI的命题,是“大模型必须在物理世界的实时约束下运行”——要省电、要低延迟、要成本可控、要行为可验证。
这意味着今天在量产车上被验证过的这套解题方法,明天可以复用到人形机器人、移动机器人,以及一切需要“聪明的大脑+可控的躯体”的物理AI产品上。
也因此,未来芯片的持续研发与规模交付,夯实的不只是Momenta在汽车赛道的长期竞争力,更是两家公司为整个物理AI时代铺设的智能底座。
大模型芯片的前景如何,资本市场的动作往往最诚实。
XHEART的战略融资,参投阵容很有看点:雷诺集团首次投资,奇瑞汽车追加,长鑫科技入局。
产业端,开始真金白银地下注了。
三家资方的诉求各不相同:雷诺看中的是智驾供应链的确定性与下一代车型的计算底座;奇瑞追加投资,要的是量产芯片稳定供给的深度绑定;长鑫科技的入局,则指向存储与算力协同的产业纵深。
诉求不同,但指向同一个判断:一家能把算法能力硬件化的芯片公司,在智驾走向软硬一体的趋势里,有不可替代的位置。
对XHEART而言,这笔融资的意义不在于财务数字,而在于未来芯片持续研发和规模交付的确定性。
芯片是一门重资产生意:从架构立项到流片上车以年计,持续的研发投入、产能保障、车规认证,每一环都需要长期弹药。
50亿融资与已经铺开的客户阵列,就是这种确定性的最佳展现。
眼下,汽车行业的规模化L4是确定的,模型能力与量产能力同步增长的需求是确定的;剩下的变数在供给端。
接下来,谁先贯通了模型、芯片与整车应用,谁就可能真正打开通向未来的那扇门。
而眼下,打开这扇的钥匙已经握在了Momenta和XHEART的手中。
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【数智周报】张一鸣以6700亿元登顶中国首富,刷新中国首富财富纪录;阿里巴巴与Apple达成合作,将千问集成至Apple智能;Anthropic提交IPO注册文件,拟以“ANT”为代码在纳斯达克上市
(本文作者为 ITValue,钛媒体经授权发布)

观点
城堡投资Salame警示AI融资风险:浪潮之下“一些船会沉没”
城堡投资联席首席投资官Pablo Salame表示,支撑AI革命的巨大资本需求,正与态度谨慎、不愿承担如此大风险的贷款机构发生冲突。他表示,这将迫使追求数倍投资回报的选股投资者与需要确保资金能够收回的债权人之间重新寻求平衡。Salame说,“AI浪潮虽会水涨船高,但也会让一些船沉没,而且这股浪潮还将充满起伏。”
马斯克与黄仁勋观点打架,摩根大通:超大规模AI数据中心运营商状况良好是市场共识
SpaceX首席执行官马斯克最新警告,200多家新云公司将大规模倒闭或合并,有些公司能挺过去,但不会很多。
而马斯克的这番警告与英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋此前的观点几乎截然相反。黄仁勋在GTC大会上指出,市场对新云的需求远超预期。他虽然也提到了目前新云公司亟需资金支持,而资金正面临短缺的问题,但他认为这一问题一定会得到解决。
杰富瑞分析师指出,马斯克的言论引发了新一轮的恐慌交易。摩根大通则认为,人工智能债务市场对人工智能基础设施变得更加挑剔,但对于更广泛的融资危机不以为然。摩根大通市场情报团队强调,信贷短缺令人担忧,但目前的共识是超大规模数据中心运营商状况良好,大型运营商将继续占据主导地位,包括新型云服务商在内的小型企业的投资回报率也仍然为正。
亚马逊CEO:预计AWS未来两年收入同比增速都将高于40%,5-10年有望成长为万亿美元营收规模业务
亚马逊首席执行官安迪·贾西在亚马逊财报电话会上,对其AWS云业务前景绘制了极为宏大的前景。他表示:“AWS的年化收入已达1840亿美元,但发展机遇依然巨大……我们预计AWS 2027、2028每年同比增速都将高于40%,未来5-10年有望成长为万亿美元营收规模业务。”
国内资讯
中兴通讯:第三季度净利润13.07亿元,同比增长394.46%
中兴通讯公告称,前三季度实现营业收入1168.38亿元,同比增长16.23%;归属于上市公司股东的净利润40.60亿元,同比下降23.71%。第三季度营业收入388.13亿元,同比增长33.99%;归属于上市公司股东的净利润13.07亿元,同比增长394.46%。
张一鸣以6700亿元登顶中国首富,刷新中国首富财富纪录
胡润研究院发布《2026胡润百富榜》。字节跳动创始人张一鸣以6700亿元第二次成为中国首富,刷新中国首富的财富纪录;DeepSeek的梁文锋首次上榜便以2800亿元财富,进入榜单前十。
腾讯汤道生:腾讯云正加快全球数据中心建设
在腾讯全球数字生态大会上,腾讯集团高级执行副总裁、云与智慧产业事业群CEO汤道生现场表示,腾讯云正加快全球数据中心建设。目前,腾讯云已在全球部署超200万台服务器,覆盖25个地理区域和70个可用区。过去一年,腾讯云在德国法兰克福、马来西亚、墨西哥、日本大阪、沙特利雅得及泰国新增或扩容了数据中心。未来一年,腾讯云将进一步扩展亚洲、中东、欧洲、美洲的整体布局,持续为客户打造高性价比的基础设施,以满足AI时代激增的通算与存储需求。
蚂蚁集团发布灵光2.0
蚂蚁集团发布灵光2.0,可支持在开放环境中调用MCP、CLI等工具。据了解,灵光App是蚂蚁集团推出的全模态通用AI助手,于2025年11月18日正式上线,目前已内置支付宝账单、会员、出行,以及钉钉、飞书、邮箱、米家等服务能力。
宇树科技:第三季度净利润1.13亿元,同比下降17.37%
宇树科技公告称,第三季度营业收入为6.65亿元,同比增长69.93%;归属于上市公司股东的净利润为1.13亿元,同比下降17.37%。前三季度营业收入为18.17亿元,同比增长55.71%;归属于上市公司股东的净利润为3.87亿元,同比增长270.54%。
豆包工作升级电脑操作能力:支持技能录制与锁屏执行
豆包工作升级电脑操作能力,屏幕点击精度与速度提升。用户授权后,其可自动查看屏幕并模拟键鼠操作。通过“更多技能”入口可录制电脑操作,演示一遍流程,豆包即记录鼠标点击、文字输入及窗口内容,整理为个人技能,实现同类任务快速复用。
此外,用户可在设置中开启“允许豆包在锁屏时工作”。开启后,豆包可在Mac锁屏后继续执行任务,支持手机下达指令及查看结果。
豆包工作向企业客户开放配置三方模型
豆包工作向客户开放三方大模型服务,首批将接入 Kimi 3.1 Pro、GLM 5.3、DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 等系列模型。本次更新面向团队订阅版和企业订阅版客户开放。功能上线后默认直接开启,企业无需另行向模型厂商采购,也无需额外申请,后续按照用量扣除企业已有的AI点数,真正实现开箱即用。
腾讯WorkBuddy上线“远程控制”
腾讯WorkBuddy宣布正式上线“远程控制”,在手机上打开App,一键连上电脑,就能看到电脑桌面的实时画面,并直接动手接管。
华为将韬定律思想引入基站设计,发布新一代移动通信网产品及解决方案
在Decoding China 2026活动上,华为宣布首次将“韬(τ)定律”的时间缩微理念引入基站产品设计,并用“算不完、传不全”概括传统基带在单个TTI内面临的挑战。同时,华为发布OSCAR智能信道处理方案与新一代UBBPi基带系列。围绕单个TTI内的计算与传输约束,方向给出对整网协同的表述。
阿里巴巴与Apple达成合作,将千问集成至Apple智能
阿里巴巴与Apple达成合作,将千问集成至Apple智能,中国用户可以在Siri、写作工具及视觉智能中,直接调用千问的文本与图像理解、内容生成等能力。这些功能将于11月4日起随最新的iOS开发者Beta版开放测试,并将于12月iOS 27.3正式发布时面向中国用户推出。
海外消息
Anthropic提交IPO注册文件,拟以“ANT”为代码在纳斯达克上市
人工智能初创公司Anthropic向美国证券交易委员会提交S-1注册文件,计划首次公开发行A类普通股,并申请在纳斯达克全球精选市场以“ANT”为代码上市。文件暂未披露发行股数、发行价格区间及具体发行日期。
Meta预计2026年资本开支最高1450亿美元,计划通过股权融资等方式支持AI投资
Meta表示,预计2026年资本开支为1350亿至1450亿美元。公司称,AI投资已通过提升用户参与度、改善广告表现及提高变现效率带来实际回报,未来还将投资个人超级智能、消费级及企业级AI智能体、AI眼镜等业务。Meta计划通过经营现金流、投资级债务、战略合作及股权资本等多种方式为相关投资提供资金。2026年前三季度,公司经营现金流为970亿美元;截至三季度末,现金、现金等价物及有价证券约820亿美元。
甲骨文联合OpenAI推出企业AI产品套件,覆盖办公、开发与网络安全
甲骨文宣布与OpenAI扩大合作,将其模型、ChatGPT和Codex整合至甲骨文的应用、数据及云基础设施。双方推出多项企业AI产品,包括可通过ChatGPT调用企业系统的Oracle AI Workspace、利用AI模型检测和修复漏洞的Oracle AI Security Mesh,以及支持员工借助Codex开发企业应用的Oracle App Composer。
谷歌推出最新世界模型Genie 4,模拟时长翻倍至2分钟、首次实现音视频同步生成
谷歌DeepMind推出最新世界模型Genie 4,并宣称是其迄今最逼真、交互能力最强的世界模型。与主要根据提示词生成视频片段的传统视频生成模型不同,Genie 4能够根据文本指令构建可探索的虚拟环境,并在用户持续输入指令时实时调整场景。谷歌表示,其最长可以维持两分钟连贯不变的场景,时长约为上一代Genie 3的两倍。该模型还能生成和虚拟世界同步的实时音频,涵盖音乐、环境音以及可交互对话。
融资并购
Meta拟融资350亿美元并计划推出600亿美元股票发行计划
Meta宣布启动总规模约350亿美元的同步公开发行,包括225亿美元A类普通股和125亿美元强制可转换优先股存托股份,并计划于2027年第一季度推出最高600亿美元的场内股票发行计划。英伟达、AMD和博通已表示有意合计认购最高50亿美元的A类普通股,但尚未作出有约束力的承诺。
OpenAI据称将新一轮融资目标下调100亿美元,拟以1.25万亿美元估值融资200亿美元
OpenAI已将最新一轮融资目标下调100亿美元,计划融资200亿美元,对应估值1.25万亿美元。此前,该公司原计划以1.4万亿美元估值融资300亿美元。
中科慧灵完成数亿元A++轮融资
北京中科慧灵机器人技术有限公司,完成数亿元人民币A++轮融资。本轮融资由知来投资、涌铧投资、茂天投资、元禾辰坤、国科科智、鲁宁投资等机构联合投资。投资方涵盖市场化股权投资机构、专业母基金及产业投资平台,投资布局涉及人工智能、硬科技、先进制造等领域。

超球面科技完成数亿元天使轮融资
深圳超球面科技有限公司完成数亿元天使轮融资,由君联资本、某超一线美元基金、中科创星、商汤国香资本、华山资本WestSummit Capital、庚辛资本中国 等机构共同投资,庚辛资本中国担任独家兼长期战略财务顾问。公司由香港中文大学教授刘威杨创立,聚焦下一代基础模型研发。
趋境科技完成B轮超13亿元融资
AI Token生产服务商趋境科技(Approaching.AI)完成B轮融资,本轮融资金额超13亿元,今年内已累计募得24亿元。本轮融资由浙财资本、萧山资本、工银投资、中关村科学城、星连资本及钱江世纪城共同领投,云创资本、湖南高新纵横、建投华科、申万创新投、中信聚信、珠海科技产业集团、商汤科技、网宿科技、甘肃树帜、常金控、元智未来、清证星竹、小咖资本等跟投,老股东尚势资本继续追投。
文远知行子公司景烁科技首轮融资数千万美元,布局物理AI
文远知行旗下子公司景烁科技获得数千万美元Pre-A轮融资,投资方包括嘉御资本、HKSTP香港科技园、天狼星资本等。景烁科技主要布局物理AI数据与模型基础设施,目前已推出数据-模型一体化平台WorldEngine及世界模型GENESIS-Robotics。据公司披露,目前其在手订单金额达数十亿元,年收入增长超100%。
趋势
宇树科技:人形机器人行业尚处商业化早期,物理AI技术从实验室演示走向真实场景规模化落地仍面临多重挑战
宇树科技公告称,人形机器人行业尚处于商业化早期,技术成熟度、下游市场需求培育、产业链配套能力均存在不确定性。同时,物理AI技术从实验室演示走向真实场景的规模化落地仍面临感知精度、运动控制稳定性、数据积累及软硬件协同等多重挑战,相关技术路径与商业模式的成熟尚需时间验证。若行业大规模商业化落地进度不及预期,公司未来营收扩张及业绩释放可能受到不利影响,存在估值回归的投资风险。
中信证券:GPT-6 Astra进入机器人控制,物理AI迎来重大拐点
中信证券研报称,通用大模型正在从机器人的高层任务规划,进一步向动作生成和执行控制延伸。近期,NVIDIA、Stanford等研究机构陆续探索将GPT-6 Astra应用于机器人控制,尝试利用通用模型已有的视觉理解、空间推理和任务规划能力,减少对专用策略训练的依赖。Astra在具身任务的数据集上展现出了较好的泛化性,中信证券认为,展望2027年,通用模型进入具身任务领域将成为AI行业的下一个投入方向,而通用模型与专用模型短期更可能形成分工协同的局面。
人形机器人应用持续拓展,核心零部件投资机遇受关注
商务部发布的数据显示,今年前三季度,重点平台具身智能机器人销售额同比增长22.6%。从消费端需求增长,到具身智能整机及配套项目推进,机器人产业的应用与商业化进展受到关注。分析人士认为,人形机器人产业正处于量产验证与场景落地的重要阶段,投资机会有望向核心零部件、控制平台和数据基础设施等环节延伸。随着产业发展更加重视实际应用,应关注企业技术优势、成本控制和批量交付能力,以及订单落地与模型迭代进展。
SK海力士预计存储市场供不应求局面将持续至2030年
SK海力士表示,受先进制程技术难度提升及新建生产设施耗时较长等因素影响,存储市场供不应求格局预计将持续至2030年。公司计划加快扩产,预计第四季度HBM4在出货量和营收方面均将超过HBM3E;同时计划将321层NAND工艺占韩国本土产能的比重提升至50%以上,以增加高性能、大容量企业级固态硬盘供应。
亚洲芯片股下跌,围绕大型科技公司的AI融资担忧加剧
决定AI交易前景的关键财报季表现平平,导致全球芯片制造商股价下跌,投资者越来越担心成本飙升和需求的可持续性。最新触发因素包括亚马逊的大规模资本支出数字、英特尔因个人电脑处理器需求疲软发布低于预期的销售预测。这进一步加剧了投资者对AI热潮融资成本高昂以及这些巨额投资能否获得回报的担忧。亚洲芯片制造商普跌,其中,韩国SK海力士和日本爱德万测试跌幅最大,均超过6%。韩国Kospi指数一度下跌4.3%。
“本财报季对人工智能企业来说很艰难,大多数企业都受到了人工智能泡沫和通胀担忧的双重打击,”Floodlines Research创始人、投资策略师Anna Wu表示。“更高的融资成本和信用风险最终可能会迫使超大规模数据中心运营商放缓扩张步伐。”
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Turbo4DGen: Ultra-Fast Acceleration for 4D Generation
Aligned Delta-Triplane Transformers as Occupancy World Models
World Model Science: Self-Organized Criticality, Weak Chaos, and Metastable Belief Dynamics in Long-Horizon LLM Agents
WorldFlow: Joint Video and 3D Motion Prediction via Large-Scale Pretraining
Generating Critic-Guided Synthetic Experience in Latent World Models
Tactus: Tactile & Pose Sensing Glove for Natural Dexterity Data Collection
Explore Where It Matters: Targeted Exploration for Efficient Rover Adaptation
Self-Supervised Latent Action-Conditioned World Modeling for Time Series
When More Planning Hurts: Learned Planners for World Models
Algebraic World Model: From Exploration to Proofs
Cheap Retrieval and Observation Credit Assignment from One Quantity: The Value of Information
Context Compaction for World Models
Predict the Reward, Not the World: World Reward Models for ML Agents
Reviewing my 2017 AI Risk Project
In 2017, after getting laid off from a startup, I spent a while looking into AI risk:
Many people I respect have started to think that AI risk is the most valuable place to focus EA efforts. For example, 80000 Hours ranks it first on their "list of global issues", taking into account "scale, neglectedness, and solvability". On the other hand, I have a lot of friends working in machine learning, and none of them think AI risk is worth working on now. This level of disagreement is very strange, and kind of worrying.
After playing for a dance weekend in South Carolina where casual conversation among non-tech people included earnest speculation over the likelihood that AI gets us all killed, I thought it might be a good time to look back at when this was really speculative.
Summary: I talked to the right people, heard some incredibly prescient ideas, and got the bottom line wrong.
I do a lot of my thinking via serial writing, and in this case that was a series of twelve blog posts. Taking them one at a time:
Looking into AI Risk (2017-06-26).
This held up well. I picked something well worth looking into, identified a lot of relevant resources, and got a lot more good reading recommendations in the comments.
Superintelligence Risk Project (2017-07-03).
The main part of this post were five ideas about where the disagreement might be. These worked ok as jumping off points for interviews, but they weren't as core to disagreements as I hoped: people often ended up with similar views on most of these ideas while still being far apart in their views on how we should prioritize AI risk.
One thing I do like, though, is that these were pretty concrete questions which now do have answers:
How likely is it that current approaches are all we need for AGI, with relatively straightforward extensions and a lot of scaling?
Very likely. When I asked this question, "current approaches" meant deep neural nets and reinforcement learning. The past nine years have mostly been an incredible amount of scaling.
How valuable is it to work on solving problems that are probably not the right ones? For example, even if we think AGI will not look like current systems, might trying to solve the control problem for current systems teach us enough about the underlying problem and how to do this kind of work that we'll be in a better position once we see more what AGI will actually look like?
Looking at the two best-known approaches in 2017, I'd say Concrete Problems in AI Safety has held up extremely well, while Highly Reliable Agent Design (contemporaneous review) less so. This makes sense, since the paradigm of the former (scale current things) is what happened, while the latter assumed we'd get to powerful AI systems via explicit systems with world modeling, decision theory, etc.
Still, even the HRAD work did end up being pretty useful, by getting people thinking about important problems, naming things, building a field, and getting people spun up.
So I'd say work was pretty useful even if you didn't anticipate the shape of today's AI.
How useful is it to have a strong theoretical foundation, vs just understanding the technology enough from an engineering perspective that we can make it do things for us?
In terms of building powerful AI systems, it seems like it has been near 100% engineering. On the other hand, we now have powerful systems that no one understands. As they get increasingly capable will they continue to be compatible with the continued existence of humanity? Hard to say! Seems like a strong theoretical foundation would be pretty useful.
How similar is this to normal engineering? How much should we expect companies' desires that their AI systems do what they want them to do to work out?
Mostly yes, but more importantly no. Companies want their models to be economically useful which means doing what users want. Except it turns out you can provide a ton of economic value while still occasionally being seriously misaligned, and there's a real chance that as we continue to scale this misalignment is going to work out very poorly.
As we get closer to AGI, how likely is the ML community to take superintelligence risk seriously? Is it just that they don't think it can be productively worked on now or do they not think it will ever be a real problem?
People are taking this increasingly seriously, and I think this has probably gone better than people in 2017 would have predicted. But it doesn't look to me like they're taking it seriously enough: the majority of work still looks like forging ahead very quickly despite a lot of evidence of misalignment even at current scales.
There's also a bit in the post where I talked about applying for a grant to work on this. That was silly, since we had enough savings that this was something I could just choose to do. Looking back, I think the reason I applied was that I had an unrealistic view of grantmakers as people with an excellent global view of what needed doing, and where someone deciding whether to give me a grant to work on this project would be a strong signal of whether the project was worth doing.
(And then perhaps my most prescient decision was calling it "Superintelligence Risk" instead of "Artificial Intelligence Risk", anticipating executive order 14434.)
2017-07-04: Conversation with Dario Amodei
Alan Kay said "the best way to predict the future is to invent it," which certainly seems true here. This description of the situation feels super prescient. Unfortunately I never thought to ask the most important question: might AI reliably doing what we want end up being a limiting factor on AI progress, where this line of safety research might accelerate AI development and put us in what Amodei then considered the riskier "short timelines" path.
2017-07-09: Conversation with Michael Littman
Littman essentially believed that prosaic AGI, which Paul Christiano described as replicating human behavior without "qualitatively new ideas about 'how intelligence works'", was impossible. But that's pretty much what happened! So in many ways it's a big miss. I don't want to single Littman out, however, since in this series he's basically functioning as a stand-in for the mainstream ML community view at the time. Most serious professionals seemed to think this, and even Amodei and Christiano weren't confident this was how things would go.
2017-07-10: